dsh-browser-playwright-codex

LIMITATIONS

已知限制

- **Persistent mode is one shared window** — all calling sessions drive the same profile-backed window and share its login state and tabs. Ideal for a personal assistant; if you need hard per-session isolation (separate logins per conversation), set `launch.persistent: false` and manage per-owner contexts, or run separate DSH profiles. - **Headless servers must opt in** — the bundle defaults to `headless: false`; on a headless/remote host set `launch.headless: true`. - **Selector-free, not vision-free** — interaction is a11y-tree based; purely visual widgets (canvas, WebGL, custom-drawn controls) may expose no refs. `browser_screenshot` + an image-capable model is the fallback. - **Cross-origin iframes** appear as leaf `(frame)` nodes without refs; same-origin frames are walked up to two levels deep. - **Evaluate gate is config, not approval** — enabling `allowEvaluate` trusts the model with arbitrary page JavaScript; compose it with the harness approval/permission policy for stricter control. The gate is enforced in **two** places: `tool.ts` refuses before a browser is even launched, and the session itself refuses too (`EVALUATE_DISABLED` / `CDP_DISABLED`), so a sibling plugin or a script holding the browser service cannot go around it. A gate that was never published counts as **off**. `browser_cdp` additionally passes the CDP allow-list at the session layer, so `Runtime.evaluate` is rejected even with the switch on. - **The package ships both power gates OFF, and that is deliberate** — `cordis.patch.yml` is part of the package, so anything it enables is enabled for *everyone who installs this*. It therefore sets `allowEvaluate: false` and `allowCdp: false` (the code defaults), and each deployment opts in through its **own profile patch** (`~/.dsh/profiles/<name>/cordis.patch.yml`). A package that shipped them on would be handing every installer a backdoor they never asked for. Snippet: ```yaml # dsh replaces an entry's config object wholesale — list every key you rely on. - id: browser config: service: { provider: playwright } playwright: { launch: { headless: false, persistent: true }, idleTimeoutMs: 0, maxSessions: 8, snapshot: { diff: false } } tool: toolPrefix: 'browser_' allowEvaluate: true # registers browser_evaluate allowCdp: true # registers browser_cdp (needs a full DSH restart) registerDisabledTools: false maxWaitMs: 60000 ``` - **`launch.viewport` only applies headless** — the visible window is a real window: it tracks the desktop size (`browser-lifecycle.ts` passes `viewport: null` in headful), so setting 1280×800 there changes nothing. Pin the size by running `headless: true`, or resize the window itself. - **Chromium family only** — Firefox/WebKit channels are not probed; providers are swappable if another engine is needed. - **Extract needs a dedicated model route** — it does not reuse the main request's route; misconfiguration fails loudly at call time. - **`allowedDomains` is enforced on the wire, not just at the entry points** — the host list is installed on the browser context itself (`navigation-guard.ts`), so a navigation nobody vetted is refused by the browser: `location.href = …`, `meta refresh`, a `<form>` posting to another host and a page-opened popup all stop at the request. Data requests (`fetch` / `xhr` / `EventSource`) to a host outside the list are refused too, so page script cannot move data off-site; rendering assets (script / image / CSS / font / media) are left alone, because blocking them only makes a page look broken. `browser_navigate`, `browser_open_tab`, every navigating click and `browser_switch_tab` still check first — that is what produces the friendly error before anything happens. One case needs a second look, because Chromium follows a redirect inside its own network stack where request interception never sees the hop: after every action the page's final URL is checked, and a landing outside the li